Notes

1 J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo, "Introduction: A World in Motion," in J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo (eds.), *The Anthropology of Globalization* (London: Blackwell, 2002), p. 2.
2 ibid., p. 4.
3 John Middleton, *The World of Swahili: An African Mercantile Civilization*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). For a history of the Indian Ocean world system, see Hikoichi Yajima, *A Civilization Created by the Ocean* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Publishers, 1993, in Japanese).
4 The Arabic word, *Suuna*, means "the customs and practices of the Prophet" and refers to the second source of Islamic law. The *salafiya* is a type of modern Islamic reformism.
5 My field research in Mombasa and Lamu was carried out in 1999 and 2001, during which I stayed in Lamu about ten days. The proper names written in this paper will be spelled in Arabic, not Swahili.
6 For an anthropological study of Habib Salih and the Riyadh mosque, see Abdul Hamid el-Zein, *The Sacred Meadow* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Note however that the official document on the life of Habib Salih and his descendants and the mosque harshly criticizes el-Zein's work for containing a great deal of incorrect information. See Salih M. Ali Badawi, *Al-Riyadh bayna madihi wa hadrhi* (Zanzibar: Al-Khayria Press, 1989), p. 19. I have relied on this book in Arabic for basic information about the life of Habib Salih, his descendants, and the Riyadh Mosque.
7 The owner of the hotel, who was nearly the same age as Hamid, also referred to this event as a crucial factor leading to his conversion. According to the owner, about a hundred youths in Lamu turned to the Twelver Shi'i sect for the same reason.
8 The *'Ashura*, an Arabic word derived from *ashara* (ten), is an annual mourning ceremony conducted mainly by the Twelvers on the tenth day of the first month (*muharram*) of the Islamic calendar to commemorate the day when Husayn ibn Ali was slain by the Umayyad family or, from the Shi'i perspective, was martyred in Karbala.
9 Needless to say, Islam was introduced to the Southeast Asian countries and the countries in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean regional world system via sea routes by Arabian and Persian merchants.

11
Presentable ethnicity: Constituting Mien in contemporary Thailand

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Is Southeast Asia a region, and, if so, how does the region engage with the dynamics that are considered global? This is a murky terrain, both conceptually and descriptively; I will address this large question in terms of how the "local" has been reconfigured. Since globalization and related concepts often seem to invite discussion of things "modern," in variously urban or deterritorialized spatial terms,[1] my choice to focus on a rural ethnic minority population at a village fair may seem odd. But the issues that my "local" case revolves around—of society, culture, identity and marginalization—are entangled in various ways with key aspects of a contemporary global order, among them capitalist transformations, tensions in nation-state alignments, and a global discourse on indigenous people's rights. Of central importance are issues of defining tradition, that in this setting draw on "rhetorics of self-making"[2] of national and ultimately global and modernist dimensions.

In March 2001, Thailand's ethnic minority Mien people assembled for their first pan-ethnic event, a festival that consisted of four days of sports competitions and two nights of culture performances.[3] The sports played at the Mien ethnic festival were football (soccer), basketball, volleyball, takraw, boules, ping pong, and handball, all of which are associated with Thai schools. Along with daytime sports there were culture displays in the evening, including singing and instrumental music, dance, and a color photocopy of an illustrated manuscript; elements of Mien traditions that were presented to the Mien audience as collectively theirs. Also, a schoolteacher who was an important player in the public revival (or revisioning) of Mien culture suggested that Mien people have a distinctive greeting, which combined the Western handshake with the Thai *wai* gesture of respect, each accompanied by a Mien phrase.

While the culture enacted at the evening displays was recognizable as Mien and thus traditional, the displays were equally within the national contact zone[4] as were the sports and the greeting. The songs and dances at the Fair were similar to those enacted by Mien at festivals or ritual

Figure 11-1. Volleyball players at the Phulangka Games in 1993. Note their mismatched outfits.

Figure 11-2. Soccer players stretching before a game at the Mien Festival in 2001. Note that now the teams all have uniforms.

occasions such as weddings. But in contrast to the other settings where they affected the honor and status of households and kin-groups, at the fair they were all done by performers for an audience and for the purpose of displaying and preserving a culture. In this, the Mien staging of their own culture for a Mien audience partakes in the national discourse on

local or ethnic culture as dress, song, and dance that is staged in the countryside.

Both the culture shows and the sports contests contribute to a routinization of the village and the ethnic group as the units of identity and social life, which in this Mien case contributes to the undoing of households and kin-groups as the agents of social and cultural dynamics, transmission, and contest.[5] Equally, the effort to display and preserve culture involves standardization of the previously considerably diverse forms (by region, village, and kin-group) that culture takes.[6] The "culture" on display was all from the home village of the schoolteacher who had proposed the Mien greeting, and who was at the time the president of the Mien Association. To some extent, the sports, culture show, and the new body language of a formal, ethnic gesture, can all be seen as a variation of the quest for a Mien greeting, a presentation of the "ethnic" self to the national and global world. Before engaging with the event, I discuss the somewhat global context that predates this modern constitution of identity through sports and culture.

Cold War background

Like any other state in the region, the modern nation-state of Thailand has a lowland-based pre-national history that includes dealings with non-subject upland peoples in the forested hinterlands, peoples who did not live within the state's realm of ritual and political economy.[7] While such relations were varied (trade, tribute, military service, etc.), they largely faded with the demise of tributary states and statelets during the colonial era. The upland farmers, who had previously had occasional relations with lowland courts, gradually became minorities in relation to a national majority, in varying processes that indicate a fundamental restructuring of social and political relations and identities within the region more generally. As forests were redefined into national resources, upland peoples lost claims to their terrain to loggers and, later, to nationally protected forests. Thus the contemporary situation of highland ethnic minorities must be seen as informed by the somewhat global dynamics of capitalism, colonialism, and nationalism. It is not that dwelling in the high forests of mainland Southeast Asia was to be isolated from global trends, but that settlement there was in part motivated by cultural dynamics involving an articulation of difference from the state-centered society in the lowlands.

The ability to stand outside the state, as various groups of foragers and horticulturists had done for centuries, gradually faded in the twentieth century.[8] This is one aspect of how Southeast Asia as a region took particular shape in a global, colonial and postcolonial context. In Thailand, the national integration of upland ethnic minority peoples occurred in a Cold War context, in tandem with the definition of these populations as "hill tribes".[9] The consolidation of a national terrain was not only a national effort, it occurred with financial and other support from the United Nations, the United States, and the US-sponsored SEATO that focused on anti-communist campaigns, efforts to eradicate opium cultivation (which had previously been legal and under a royal monopoly), and projects designed to stabilize peoples known for settlement migration and crossing international borders.[10] This particular combination of international drug control and a regional (and global) campaign against the "spread" of communism thus involved a national attempt to administer and firmly settle peoples who had previously been beyond state control.

The effort involved anthropological research; Australian, British, and American scholars who provided detailed accounts of each of the "six main tribes"—Akha, Hmong, Karen, Lahu, Lisu, and Mien.[11] The one highland population that had the longest history in the region, Lawa, and predates the settlement of the Thai peoples, never made the list of "hill tribes" because they were not involved in opium cultivation or border crossings. Thus the category hill tribe, a term that had taken root in British colonies from India to Fiji, became central to a Cold War constitution of a national terrain in a complexly global order of anthropologists, the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the reform agenda of the United Nations, and the expansion of state control to the national borders of Thailand. This history, as much as the upland peoples' cultural and agricultural practices, defined the ethnic landscape of northern Thailand from the 1950s onwards.[12]

In the 1960s, confrontations between police and some ethnic minority uplanders led to violence. Opium cultivation had been declared illegal, and units of police and military were increasingly enforcing the ban, though in part this was posturing in order to extort money.[13] In one case, ethnic minority Hmong villagers had already paid off one unit of the armed forces when the police arrived and demanded payment. Local people resisted, and the police arrested some of the villagers. In retribution, the villagers burned down a bridge leading to a school that had been donated by members of the royal family. The school was part of a nationalist hearts and minds campaign among the ethnic minorities. What might

have been a minor dispute between police forces and the members of a village, however, became an event of national and global significance in this context of nation-building and global, Cold War anxieties.

In Thailand, there were persistent rumors that the Hmong had communist sympathies and had received training in Vietnam.[14] This was during the American war in Vietnam, and the simultaneous "secret war" in Laos where Hmong people had various affiliations. Thus the global context made the local act of retribution for extortion meaningful as a Red Meo Revolt (*kabot meo daeng*), "red" meaning "communist." Mien and many other peoples were caught up in the subsequent fighting and bombing,[15] but Hmong people were particularly singled out for attacks. There are no fundamental distinctions between the global and the regional in what influenced national understandings of the ethnic landscape, or the situation of "local" people, during this time.

The fighting that started in the 1960s was partly against members of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), many of whom were urbanites who had taken to the jungle after serious military violence on the streets of Bangkok. Some were also advocates for farmers' rights. In a particular mixture of nationalism and cold war anxieties, Thai authorities presented this political opposition as foreigners who must be exterminated or expelled from Thai soil.[16] When CPT members were granted amnesty in 1982 the national political climate relaxed significantly, but the hill tribes remained as a trope of disloyalty to the nation and a threat to national integration and wellbeing because of their non-national language, dress, customs, and supposedly destructive farming practices.[17]

Figure 11-3. Second meeting of the Mien Association in early 1993, at which the association's name, logo, and links to other nongovernmental organizations were all discussed.

In the early 1990s, an important feature of the self-representations that upland peoples engaged in was as loyal members of the nation-state. But also in the early 1990s, Mien villagers and members of IMPECT, an urban non-governmental organization (NGO) concerned with culture and development among ethnic minorities, met to form an advocacy and identity group, the Mien Association. Thus, some of the efforts related to identity politics revolved around displays of submission and orderliness toward the nation-state, while others related to an international discourse on indigenous peoples and their right to engage in culture and development on their own terms. Again, the global, national, and the local are intertwined in many complex ways. The production of highland people's marginality is equally multi-stranded. The following section briefly describes some of the issues as background to the recent forging of presentable ethnicity.

Transforming the countryside

The initial, government-sponsored research on highland peoples in the 1950s was concerned with finding ways to stop opium cultivation and halt settlement migration. It was through this research that *chao khao* (hill tribes) became a particular object of Thai knowledge. A *Report on the Socio-Economic Survey of the Hill Tribes in Northern Thailand*,[18] conducted with international funding and expertise, defined shifting cultivation as the root of all of the problems with highland peoples:

> Slash and burn agriculture is the economic foundation of the hill tribes under discussion. Without any exception they have not yet advanced to stabilized farming. As it will be seen that almost all the problems which the hill tribes constitute in this country—such as destruction of forests, opium growing, border insecurity, difficulties in administration and control—derive from this very fact. An immense progress would be made if the hill people would learn and practice cultivation in permanent fields.[19]

When a Committee for National Tribal Welfare was established in 1959, the government's

> goal was to speed the assimilation of tribal people by settling them in the fashion of Thai lowlanders on some single tract of land that would provide a living. As the uplanders 'became Thai' they would no longer grow dry rice or opium, and thus the forests would be saved and these non-Thai would be absorbed.[20]

The implied boundaries of Thai-ness were thus involved in the definition of highland peoples as a problem, boundaries that concerned farming methods as much as allegiance to the markers of nationhood. Efforts to bring shifting cultivation to an end have not only brought the territorial sovereignty of the Thai state to highland villages. They have, at the same time, projected a national point-of-view, within which the highlanders' farming practices are seen as a threat to be eliminated.[21]

"Clearly, *chao khao* lack knowledge regarding soil protection".[22] The perpetuation of agricultural, cultural, and linguistic difference of the ethnic minorities from mainstream Thai society was a threat. Construed in this way, the threat could be undone to the extent that *chao khao* "entered society:" "Their [*chao khao*] society is firmly attached to their customs. They have not been willing to change in any way along the lines of wider society. Because of this, many problems arise, for example forest destruction, security problems, and a drug problem".[23] According to an information booklet by the Tribal Research Institute:[24] "There are many hill tribe problems as identified by Thai authorities. Most of these problems are related to some aspects of the hill tribes way of life which are considered to be inappropriate to the present socio-economic and political situation of the country".[25]

A range of concerns thus informed the place of hill tribes in the views that were forged at the international and national levels. Forest- and watershed protection, the eradication of opium cultivation, modernization, and national integration all came together in the definition of a problem population. The definition of the problem peoples simultaneously facilitated the images of the international and national actors as characterized by law, sustainability, and progress. But these constructions were inseparable from the penetration of state-controlled, capitalist markets into the hinterlands. While the national and international market for opium can be seen to be part of a global, capitalist order, by this time it was in most respects an underground economy. Eliminating shifting cultivation simultaneously eliminated highland farmers' ability to fend for themselves, rendering them dependent on controlled and taxed, national and international markets. Thus, global and national dynamics came together in an effort to secure the political economic transformation of these hinterlands in ways that served both state control and capitalist expansion.[26] These dynamics assumed a

Figure 11-4. Mien school children perform a Thai dance for a visiting delegation of Yao experts from China. Their clothes are in the "classical" Thai manner. Outside of this performance, such clothes would look ridiculous.

particular understanding of culture, as consisting of ethnically specific practices that were an impediment to progress. The road to progress, according to this perspective, was through national integration, with hill tribes "entering society."

One result of political economic changes has been widespread economic marginalization in the ethnic minority highlands. In the early 1990s, the Mien village of Pangkha was a relatively prosperous settlement where people grew primarily ginger, cotton, and fruit for sale, but the local economic situation was rather grim. Very few of the households grew their own rice; most bought it in Chiangkham, a town about thirty kilometers away. The annual household expenditure on rice was typically in the range of Baht 3,000 to 6,000 (USD120–240),[27] but it was more expensive for poorer people who never had enough money to buy in bulk and instead bought a kilo or so at a time from one of the local stores in the village. The poorest people formed a distinct underclass. They held no land and thus did not farm, and tried to make a living from occasional day labor for wealthier people, earning maybe Baht 10–30 per day. The most hard up would sometimes beg for food or money in the village. The annual income of a farmer in Pangkha ranged from almost nothing to about Baht 100,000 ($4,000), with a majority in the range of Baht 7,000 to 30,000 ($280–1,200). This income for crops was offset by the rising costs of plowing, fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide for those who could afford it. One household that earned about Baht 30,000 from cotton, linchi, and mangoes, had spent about Baht 20,000 on treating their fields and orchards

in the same year. For the better off, school fees for children, or the cost of a motorcycle, tended to absorb their remaining income. Many tried to go abroad for wage work in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan, for which the initial outlay for visas and work contracts often required hefty loans. Many other settlements were worse off, and in several cases people were issued eviction orders on the grounds that they were illegally occupying land.

In this context, villagers have tried to forge connections with development projects or government agencies in order to improve their situation. In 1993, about 30 Pangkha villagers went to a meeting with the Forestry Department for Phayao Province in the district center of Pong, where the topic was the use of forest land. Most of the meeting focused on the concerns of lowland villagers about the classification of fields. Mien upland farmers, who were both vocal and articulate about their need for permanent claims to land, were met with outright and repeated dismissal. The official prejudice against ethnic minority highlanders' farming is persistent.

The Thai media most often portrays highlanders and other rural villagers as the grateful recipients of official generosity. This defines the parameters of a contact zone where rural people's identity derives from their subordinate relations to the state. An aspect of this was brought home to Mien people in Khun Haeng village, who were being trained for a health project. During the training and discussion, the topic of generating income was raised. Several possibilities were raised, including embroidery and medicinal herbs. "The research team pointed out that the purpose of this marketing was not mainly for economic gains but to give incentives to these women to generate funds to carry out their tasks".[28] That is, villagers are to make goods for sale and then use the proceeds as a form of taxation on themselves to sustain the projects that the authorities suggest and sometimes mandate, as the road to progress, but will not sponsor.

Becoming ethnic

As ethnic minority people engage with the Thai nation, their practices of everyday life and ritual have taken new forms. As mentioned, the Mien Association was established in the early 1990s; there have since been similar moves among other ethnic minority groups in the north.[29] These new organizations concern the reworking of culture and identity in the public sphere, where they previously indexed various impediments to progress. During the 1990s, novel ritual forms were activated, focusing



Figure 11-5. Mr. Witthaya Srijan, Member of Parliament for Phayao province, addresses a sub-district-wide Mien sports festival in 1993.

on the village rather than the household or kin-group. These were in many cases organized by the Village Committee, while the Village Housewives' Group cooked and served lunch for the participants. Both the Village Committee and the Housewives' Group are institutions created by the state's modernization agenda. Also in the early 1990s, ethnic minority villages were increasingly coming together for sports-meetings. These sports events appropriated important national signifiers, with politicians invited to give a speech, a flag-raising, singing the national anthem or a song honoring the Thai king, and acknowledging the administrative entities of the nation-state—that is, registered villages—as the units of competition.[30]

Sports have to some extent created the current form of Mien society. It is through social activities centered on sports and cultural performances at school-grounds that the Mien are defining themselves as a sub-nationality of sorts, and thus as a unit of Thailand. During the four-day fair in 2001, sports and culture were paired as opposites, with the daytime competitions between different villages complemented by nighttime performances of shared culture. The Mien engagement with notions of a national modernity through sports serves to reify a particular location of culture while at the same time (re)producing the distinction between tradition and modernity.[31]

Modern sports are not the opposite of ethnic traditions. Rather, they make it possible to imagine ethnic tradition as shared, of the past, and a matter of expert performers on stage. In Europe and elsewhere, the nineteenth century nationalist wave of "invented traditions" occurred

in the same historical context as the consolidation of modern sports and national communities.[32] Both sports and culture performances are about collectivities having a team that represents them in a social universe where analogous units engage with one another. Sports and culture-displays both make difference legible in the sense of homogenizing the forms of identity that get manifest in public life. In rural Thailand, sports and culture activate the village as the significant unit of mobilizing people's labor, resources, and attentions.[33] It was as hyphenated Thai that Mien manifested their identity at this fair. As Mien assembled for the event on the two hyphens between Thai-Mien and traditional-modern, the collective concern with sports and culture rendered individual-, village based-, and gendered agency ambiguous through the politics of a minority voice within a national context. The collective ethnic minority voice is the domain of the organizers of the event, the Mien Association.

Mien engagements with modern sports are within a complex and stratified world of excitement, competition, fundraising, and identification that is fundamentally national. The Mien Fair in 2001 was held at the village school in Pang Khwai, with Thai school-teachers serving as referees. It began with a parade to the school grounds where the Thai flag was ceremonially raised while the national anthem played over loudspeakers. Football (soccer) was central to the four days of the fair. It was played on the largest and central field in front of the school. On one side of the field, in front of the main school building, sat the commentators, whose ongoing description of the game was broadcast through five-foot-tall loudspeakers. On a table under the canopy was a line-up of the cups that were to be awarded for each sport. Concurrent with the football matches, the teams competed in other sports, which were gendered. Only men played football and takraw, there were separate men's and women's competitions in volleyball, basketball, and ping pong, and only women played handball and boules. This gender division corresponds to that found in Thai school sports more generally.

The social units activated for the Mien sports competition were villages. The event implies competence in the nation's sporting activities as the criteria for social engagement, and further that it is through state schools that units of Mien society are linked. Seventeen villages competed, about ten percent of the Mien villages in Thailand. There was thus a type of exclusion inherent to the event, in part, determined by relative prosperity, since only large villages had enough young men to field a football team, for instance. Additionally, villagers had to raise funds to buy team uniforms. The host village, Pang Khwai, was visibly

prosperous, which was evident from the shoes and sports clothes of their athletes as well as their ability to host the competition. There were about 500 visitors, athletes and others, and I learned that the village had raised the equivalent of more than US$5,000 to stage the event.[34] The cost involved building new toilets at the school, and buying food and drink, cups and other prizes for contestants, paying the referees, and so on. Conversations with the sponsors as well as people from the various participating villages indicated that no other Mien village in Thailand could have raised so much money for a fair. As such, the event sets a standard for social position that is beyond the reach of other villages. Host villagers made various remarks regarding their significant wealth, such as "You might find a vehicle or two in any Mien village, but here we have over 300 vehicles."

A Member of Parliament for Chiangmai Province, whose poster was up on many walls in the village, had donated money to buy prize cups. His name and party logo were on some of the cups. Sports thus serve to align Mien with the nation in many ways, such as the imagery of a national ceremony, the social framework of national schools, and the official presence of national politicians. There was a further link to the nation and the state in that the organizers in Pang Khwai had an official permit for their games from the District Office, which, complete with its Garuda insignia, the official symbol of the Thai state, was reproduced in the mimeographed booklet that contained the event's Program.[35]

The cover of the Program announced that the event was the "thirteenth Iu Mien Games." Although the games had no precursor as a Mien-wide competition, Pang Khwai had invited Mien villages from Chiangrai Province for sports contests on twelve previous occasions. With the official permit identifying the fair as the thirteenth Iu Mien Games, Pang Khwai had drawn on its own, more local past and rewritten it through the District Office in a way that officially proclaimed their prominence within the now-national world of Mien sporting events and ethnic culture more generally.

The Program broadcast the host-village's official connections, and projected their local history of sports contests onto the emerging Mien-wide social landscape. It also provided a vehicle for elements of state-control and monitoring: it provided a detailed chart of referees and other officials serving at the games, as well as the sequence of participants in the opening parade, and stipulated that all contestants must provide identification (name and a photograph) in order to qualify to compete in the sports. Although I did not observe any official monitoring of identity

during the games, these clauses in the permit indicate that this officially endorsed Mien fair was not only about the host village's link to the official world and a sanction of Mien-ness within the national landscape of sports competitions. It is equally about the state's reach, and about Mien people's formal compliance with the state's practices of control.

Sporting identity

At the recent pan-Mien fair and equally at smaller scale sports festivals during the previous decade or longer, sports have provided a vehicle for realigning Mien people as particular kinds of social entities. Sports and culture performances can be characterized as particular kinds of contact zones, not only between Thai and Mien models of sociality and identity, but also between alternative Mien models of organizing themselves, and in the relations of Mien to ethnically-other co-villagers. Sports competitions obfuscate the political dynamics of defining a particular public reality, and create national spaces for Mien to act out their identity through the engagement of audiences with expert performers on the stage and sports fields.

Ethnic minority culture and identity have thus been located within a national framework. At the Fair, elements of the national gaze were evident in the orientation of the opening ceremony and in the sponsorship of a member of the national parliament. The ways in which Mien are locating themselves within the nation are also evident in the "legibility" of the performances of sports and culture for a general audience, in the mobilization of the Housewives' Group for "domestic" duties, and in the agreement to monitor the identities of all sports contestants. Engagements with the national sphere have facilitated the embodiment of Mien as an entity, and sport plays a central role in mapping the ethnic community through the nation's administrative units into a league that identifies Mien to themselves. In this context, Mien tradition emerges, through its engagement with modernity, as the latter's opposite, thus defining the ethnic subject.

The voices of many Mien people contributed to forming the Mien Association. Among the older and village-based constituents, there was a general sense of a cultural crisis. Young men were not training to become spirit mediums, younger people in general did not know the archaic song language used at weddings, and households had entered a precarious situation as more of the young people were away for work or

education. Mien village life, as the older people knew it, was in danger of disappearing. These voices appear largely marginalized within the Mien Association's manifestation of the ethnic group, and the Mien-ness that was on display at the Fair belongs squarely "in a global context where collective identity is increasingly represented by having a culture (a distinctive way of life, tradition, form of art, craft)",[36] and where "organizational efforts to promote cultural autonomy...[serve] integration into the national society".[37]

The effort to promote and preserve Mien culture and identity reproduces various forms of inequality in local life. Only some people's voices are heard, particularly those of village headmen and schoolteachers. Women and many older people who are not educated in Thai schools have become subaltern categories, to be called upon for food service or as resource persons about ancient customs, but otherwise cut off from the dynamics of the ongoing definition of what constitutes Thailand's Mien. The teenagers that represent Mien villages in sports competitions are recipients of Mien-ness. They are mobilized in an activation of Mien society. But while the evening performances were intended for their benefit, most of the younger people had taken off to karaoke bars in a nearby Thai town by the time of the culture shows.

The public enactments of ethnicity at the Mien Association's Fair addressed the national reality. It addressed the national anxiety about unruly hill tribes with a display of orderliness, beginning with a parade and flag raising, acts of allegiance to the nation-state. The proposed Mien greeting was part of this orderly self-fashioning, to some extent aimed against the notion of hill tribes as those without manners. State structures were integral to the village-to-village competitions, Thai schoolteachers served as referees and thus agents of translocal discipline, and the permit declared compliance with state authorities. In staging their culture as presentable for a general audience, the Mien Association partook in the widespread activation of "local culture" in the Thai countryside that has in many respects been a response to the perceived effects of globalization.[38] The portrayal of Mien culture as dress, dance, and music—as a presentable heritage that can be shared by the rest of the nation—belongs to a more general move in Thailand to delight in the ethnically diverse heritage within its national borders. This quest for heritage is conditioned in important respects by a perceived threat to Thai identity from the forces of modernity.

But while Mien enact local culture in the countryside, they are at the same time engaging in a particularly national form of modernity, coming together as modern villagers to compete in modern sports on state school

grounds. Through sports and culture performances at village festivals, Mien people make themselves legible to the state and the nation. As they avail themselves to the controls of District Offices and the like, and provide fora for national politicians to promote themselves, they seek recognition as members of the nation-state. This may be the lasting relevance of sports in this setting, where teenagers are mobilized to represent villages in ballgames and the minority ethnic group emerges as a legitimate and orderly entity.

Local enactments of the nationally-mediated global

Many marginalized communities in Thailand are confronted by state structures in the form of eviction orders. In the contemporary context, the only way to counter such pressure is through an organization that is linked to other advocacy groups and sympathetic members of the media.[39] This is what the Mien Association offers its constituents: a viable framework for engaging with the nation-state in a way that defends the rights of farming populations. Simultaneously, while the Mien Association contributes in important ways to expressing culture and identity in the national public sphere, there is a direct connection between the emergence of an ethnic agenda on the national stage and the institution of new forms of local inequality.

There is no consensus within the Association as to what are the defining features of Mien culture. To some, it is the song, dance, and dress routines that link Mien to a national framework of traditional culture. To others, it is local ecological knowledge and similar features that link Mien to an international framework of indigenous peoples and their advocacy groups, a platform that aims to counter the expansion of the state structures that have radically undermined ethnic minority peoples' practices of agricultural and social difference from national society. Whether the focus is on culture or agriculture, on ethnic performance or local knowledge, what emerges from these local dynamics of everyday life in the context of globalization is that being an ethnic minority group within a nation-state calls for a bureaucratic organization and a consensus on how to present the group's identity to the national gaze.

The predominant repercussion of globalization and modernity in ethnic minority areas of northern Thailand has been the insertion of (hegemonic) national definitions of culture and identity into the practices of everyday life; the local view now assumes a national perspective. To characterize these recent changes as a redefinition of culture "from practice to

spectacle", however, serves to privilege previous articulations of culture as somehow authentic, and to undermine contemporary versions as less so. The challenge of globalization to our understanding of the changing practices of everyday life lies partly in recognizing that contact settings and regional inequalities have long defined local identities. That is, it is not new that people define themselves in relations to others; the recent prominence of national cultural anxiety[40] can be compared to the ancient Chinese emphasis on *wenhua* ("culture," lit. "literary transformation") as a constituting essence of the state's subjects and a diacritical absence among the various "barbarian" others.[41] Such discursive practices have long inserted a translocal gaze into the practices of everyday life. What is notable about the contemporary globalized context is the need to mobilize identity for engagements with the state. This is also quite recent, and it is possible that if Thailand's Hmong had mobilized in this way for an ethnic event, the authorities would have been alarmed. I do not know of any major gatherings of Hmong people in Thailand. Between 1967 and 1982 and to some extent for longer, a major gathering of any ethnic minority highlanders would most likely have triggered the mobilization of the state's armed forces. Such lurking fears may have influenced the Mien request for official endorsement of their fair from the District Office.

The politically neutral activation of ethnic identity through sports competitions and culture performances when combined with concessions to the state's regulatory practices, dis-alarms the otherwise nervous state,[42] but does not convert Mien culture from practice to spectacle. What has changed over time (and this is not a simple contrast of "the past" and the present) is whose interests lie behind the activation of Mien culture, whose voices are heard, whose labor is mobilized, what is at stake and who stands to benefit, and what structures of daily life are reinforced. All are perennial issues that concern culture and identity as matters of practice.

From this perspective, what constitutes the local is a central issue for understanding globalization and its effects. While one may single out the proposed "Mien greeting" as a postmodern hybrid and thus inauthentically Mien, this greeting does share with sports and culture performances an emphasis on the shared markers of membership in the modern nation. The sports contests, the evening culture shows, the display of an ancient scroll, and the combined *wai* and handshake with particular phrases, are all elements of the Mien presentation of themselves. They are each a form of a "Mien greeting" to the agents of national society who do not have to be present to influence the practice of everyday life, as the local view already assumes a national perspective.



Figure 11-6. Border Patrol Policemen organize ethnic minority students into neat lines in readiness for a visit by Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn in 1993.

Figure 11-7. Soldier instructs minority people how to pay proper respect to the Princess, 1993.

In the national context of how Mien engage with aspects of contemporary globalization, the issue of ethnic minority identity provides a structure for a particular set of middle-class Mien people (schoolteachers, village headmen, city-educated NGO workers) to define the collective concerns of the ethnic group. This process institutes various forms of inequality in local life, by limiting the sets of notions about ethnic identity and representation that are built into the Mien Fair as an event. Both sport and culture are agentive, they have constituted Mien as particular kinds of acting subjects. The issue of ethnic minority leverage in dealings with the nation-state is one of the promises of the recent Mien Association, and it appears to mute many of the local voices that

constitute Mien as a population in Thailand. The insertion of national parameters into the social and cultural life of a minority ethnic group is an aspect of globalization that redefines the local. One village becomes the exemplary bearer of traditional heritage and another the proud sponsor of the collective life of the ethnic group, achievements that render the majority of Mien villages inactive and invisible. Particular individuals have taken leadership positions, and it is through their often class-based notions of culture and identity that the ethnic group has taken public shape, in national terms.

In the most general terms, the ideology of traditional identity and culture in the countryside is an aspect of urban middle-class self-fashioning, and a variation on the colonial-era projection of tradition onto colonized populations. This location of tradition is an ideological project that creates the effect of modernity elsewhere, the enactment of rural tradition effects urban modernity and vice versa, and defines the parameters of a particular set of power relations.[43] The presence of such tradition-projects within rural Thailand, rather than emanating from the outside, indicates the contradictory appearances of globalization. The effort to mark ethnic minority uniqueness serves to make cultural and social forms fundamentally national, and the emphasis on maintaining traditional culture serves to modernize and standardize the forms that culture can take. The standardization of difference is a clear indication of globalization, a process that anchors new forms of local inequalities through people's engagements with nation and state in the name of an ethnic minority group.

Central to this standardization of difference is the increasing local prominence of the village and the ethnic group, both of which are premised on the Thai state's anxiety about its highland ethnic minorities. The idea of the ethnic group is mobilized for a range of issues that revolve around the contact zone of marginalized rural farmers and the Thai state. For some, the ethnic group is a framework for "local knowledge" that anchors claims to recognition in terms of indigeneity, for the purpose of more permanent rights to land. For others, the ethnic group is a unit of presentable culture, an issue to display and enjoy when members of the modernized Thai society partake of local variations of Thai-ness on weekends in the countryside. While both are tentative proposals for resignifying local practices, what emerges is the ethnic group as a framework for sports competitions between villages. And while some of the villages involved are multi-ethnic, the notion of the ethnic group as limited and sovereign serves to preclude the non-Mien (in this case) co-villagers from participating.

The household was previously the predominant unit in Mien social life. As increasingly limited access to land has precluded the prominence of household formation according to ritual dynamics, social life has shifted to the village. In this emerging context, the household has increasingly become a supplier of labor and contributions for village level action. As the smallest administrative unit of the Thai state, the village avails committee structures that activate new forms of social alignment. The Mien youth that competed on behalf of their villages are not grounded in village life. Most of them live in Thai towns or cities for work or schooling. Their sports teams might then be seen as phantasmatic representations of the villages. The young people have little daily contact with the world of farming, and are unlikely to later settle into farming life.

Both the culture shows and the sports competitions evoke a nostalgic world of coherent cultural traditions and populous villages. This may be the clearest manifestation of globalization among the events and dynamics that I have examined here. Ethnic minority people's engagements with global modernity as mediated through the nation-state animate the construction of their phantom opposites, of autonomous villages and united ethnic groups, where the structures of the capitalist state and national integration have not penetrated.

Culture's many relocations

Wallerstein,[44] followed by Wolf[45] and many others, charted some of the contours of an increasingly global economic system centered on capitalist expansion. There is in some ways nothing surprising about the integration of ethnic minority highlanders in Thailand or elsewhere in Southeast Asia into networks of capitalism and state controlled markets, labor, and resources. But this assumes a particular, Western notion of the forces of historical change and the forces that lend shape to locales, regions, and the world.[46] The region has equally been shaped by the global repercussions of a discourse on culture as apolitical and of the past. As Pemberton[47] has argued for Java in the colonial era, culture became a trope of disentangling the images and practices that reinforced particular feudal orders of society. What can be called the invention of culture, for ceremonial purposes as much as for academic study, contributed to the forging of new political terrains, which systemically undermined the resonance of the political and social systems that colonial and national regimes set out to replace. This was simultaneously a discourse of identity that assumed that a people had a culture, and that they could be represented on stage.[48]

While such culture discourse was partly marginalized by modernization projects, it has been revamped in a multitude of celebratory efforts whose ultimate reference is the modern nation-state. "Beautiful Indonesia in miniature",[49] the Mien display of their culture for a generalized audience at the fair in 2001, and many other cases from across the region are examples of this trend. This forging of local identities in a global context can be placed in various analytical contexts, including that of the "localizations" that Wolters[50] shows have long served to lend shape to social, political, and cultural life in Southeast Asia.

The urban-based staff of IMPECT was keen on articulations of culture that concerned rights and resource use. This position assumes a global discourse on indigenous people, and is increasingly aired for claims to local, environmental wisdom and for the right to livelihood.[51] This postcolonial articulation of culture strives, among many other things, to counter the notion of hill tribes as inherently destructive of the environment, and thus to undermine the discursive trope of hill tribes in Thailand.[52] This novel position on what constitutes culture (and identity) was aired at a meeting with village representatives during the Mien sports and culture fair.[53] It stands in sharp contrast to the modernist agenda that "locates" culture in the past, a shared heritage that can be staged for an audience.

These tensions over culture are recent and unresolved, and stand as a reminder that the local is being forged in relation to the national, regional, and global in many ways simultaneously. The tentative relocation of culture is one example of the "alternative modernities"[54] that challenge previous models for the academic study of regions in globalization, as it strives to establish a framework for rights to livelihood and recognition for impoverished farming populations. Issues of marginalization and hegemony[55] dissolve the assumed difference between culture and politics, firmly unsettle the implicit teleology of notions such as global forces and local responses, and may reinvigorate analytical attempts to contextualize the dynamics that shape locales and regions. The global is never non-local.

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Notes

1 Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Political Economy," *Public Culture* 2 (2) (1990), pp. 1–24.

2 Debbora Battaglia (ed.), *Rhetorics of Self-Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

3 This paper is a significantly revised version of my "Mien Through Sports and Culture: Mobilizing Minority Identity in Thailand," *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology* 68:3 (2003), pp. 317–40, copyright Taylor and Francis, used with permission. Mien, sometimes Iu Mien, are one of many peoples known as Yao in southern China and elsewhere.

4 For discussions of the term contact zone, see Mary L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992) and James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

5 On previous forms of Mien social life, cultural practice, and inequality, and a discussion of previous ethnographic work on Thailand's Mien, see Hjorleifur Jonsson, *Mien Relations: Mountain Peoples, Ethnography, and State Control* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

6 For an Indonesian parallel, see Rita S. Kipp, *Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, Religion and Class in an Indonesian Society* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993). For a different contextualization of the process in relation to Canada and the West more generally, see Richard Handler, "On Having a Culture: Nationalism and the Preservation of Quebec's Patrimoine," in George W.Stocking (ed.), *Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 192–217.

7 This upland-lowland divide was pervasive across the region, as well as in adjacent India and China. In Braudelian fashion, it can be called a structure of the long run that influenced the shape of social and political relations: see Fernand Braudel, *On History*, Sarah Matthews (tr.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). K. N. Chaudhuri, who has charted *Asia Before Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) in this way, views the persistence of shifting cultivators as an indication of the lack of population pressure in certain areas (p. 220), thus sidestepping the issue of upland-lowland relations and highland dynamics as integral to the constitution of a region in history.

8 Marina Roseman, "Singers of the Landscape: Song, History, and Property Rights in the Malaysian Rain Forest," *American Anthropologist* 100 (1) (1999), pp. 106–21.

9 In Thai, *chao khao*, lit. "mountain peoples". See Pinkaew Laungaramsri, *Redefining Nature: Karen Ecological Knowledge and the Challenge to the Modern Conservation Paradigm* (Chennai, India: Earthworm Books, 2001). I use the term hill tribes deliberately to call attention to the position of ethnic minority people in the national and global public sphere, as troublemakers and a threat to nation and nature.

10 Nicola Tannenbaum, "Foreword" in Jane R. Hanks and Lucien M. Hanks, *Tribes of the North Thailand Frontier* (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 2002), pp. xi–xxxix.

11 William Geddes, "The Tribal Research Center, Thailand: An Account of Plans and Activities," in Peter Kunstadter (ed.), *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations*, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 553–81; Peter Hinton, "Do the Karen Really Exist?" in John McKinnon and Wanat Bhruksasri (eds.), *Highlanders of Thailand* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 155–68.

12 There is a similarly complex, translocal trajectory behind the ethnic label "Montagnard" in Vietnam. See Jonsson, "French Natural in the Vietnamese Highlands: Nostalgia and Erasure in Montagnard Identity," in Jane Winston and Leakthina Ollier (ed.), *Of Vietnam: Identities in Dialogue* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 52–65.

13 On aspects of the convoluted history of opium production, trade and suppression, see Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991).

14 William Smalley, *Linguistic Diversity and National Unity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

15 For the massive violence, see Robert Hearn, *Thai Government Programs in Refugee Relocation and Resettlement in Northern Thailand* (Auburn, NY: Thailand Books, 1974). See Katherine Bowie, *Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the Village Scout Movement in Thailand* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) for the national political climate during this time.

16 Thongchai Winichakul describes how articulations of Thai-ness were used to discredit opposition. See *Siam Mapped: The History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).

17 John McKinnon, "Structural Assimilation and the Consensus: Clearing Grounds on Which to Rearrange Our Thoughts," in McKinnon and Bernard Vienne (eds.), *Hill Tribes Today: Problems in Change* (Bangkok: White Lotus-ORSTOM, 1989), pp. 303–59.

18 Department of Public Welfare, Thailand, *Report on the Socio-economic Survey of the Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand* (Bangkok: Ministry of Interior, 1962).

19 *ibid.*, p. 17.

20 Jane R. Hanks and Lucien M. Hanks, *Tribes of the North Thailand Frontier* (New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies Monographs, 2002), p. 128.

21 Somphon Rathanakhon, "Legal Aspects of Land Occupation and Development," in Peter Kunstadter, E. C. Chapman and Sanga Sabhasri (eds.), *Farmers in the Forest: Economic Development and Marginal Agriculture in Northern Thailand* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), p. 48.

22 Khajadphai Burusaphathana, *Chao Khao* ["Hill Tribes"] (Bangkok: Phrae Phittiya, 1985), p. 17.

23 Saimuang Wirayasiri, *Chao khao nai thai* ["Hill tribes in Thailand"] (Bangkok: Khurusapha, 1986), p. 48.

24 Tribal Research Institute, *The Hill Tribes of Thailand* (Chiangmai: Tribal Research Institute, 4th ed., 1995).

25 *ibid.*, p. 2.

26 In socialist Vietnam, there have been analogous efforts to place farmers within orbits of state control, first in the name of collectivization and subsequently in terms of market reforms. The Vietnam Museum of Ethnology displays a space-time sequence which "explains" how the ethnic minority highlanders used to be isolated, but that the government's economic restructuring has subsequently brought them many benefits. See Jonsson, "Museum Lessons: Situating Peoples and History in Thailand and Vietnam," in Yukio Hayashi (ed.), *Interethnic Relations and Globalization in the Making of Mainland Southeast Asia and Southwest China* (Kyoto: Kyoto University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). For a discussion of transformations in the Southeast Asian countryside, see Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton and Benjamin White (eds.),

Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

27 All figures assume an exchange rate between 1990 and 1996 of roughly Thai Baht 25 to one US Dollar until otherwise noted.

28 Orapin Singhadej, "The Yaos of Lampang Province, Thailand," in T. S. Osteria (ed.), *Women in Health Development: Case Studies of Select Ethnic Groups in Rural Asia-Pacific* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 64.

29 Yuji Baba, "Thai Lue Migration and Changing Spirit Cult in the Context of the Nation State and Recent Transnational Movements," in Y. Hayashi (ed.), *Interethnic Relations and Globalization in the Making of Mainland Southeast Asia and Southwest China* (2005).

30 H. Jonsson, "Traditional Tribal What? Sports, culture, and the state in the Northern Hills of Thailand," in Jean Michaud (ed.), *Turbulent Times and Enduring Peoples: Mountain Minorities in the South-East Asian Massif* (London: Curzon Press, 2000a), pp. 219–45.

31 Arjun Appadurai's study of how cricket allowed Indians to "play with modernity" offers interesting parallels. See "Playing with Modernity: The Decolonization of Indian Cricket," in Carol A.Breckenridge (ed.), *Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 23–48.

32 Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870–1914," in Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263–307.

33 Anecdotal evidence suggests that during the 1960s, US Peace Corps volunteers were instrumental in establishing sports as village events, for fundraising as much as to bring fun and pleasure to peasant life in the lowlands. This was at a time of various other US involvements in Thai affairs; military, economic, sexual, cultural, and political: See Benedict Anderson, "Introduction" in Anderson and Ruchira Mendiones (ed. and tr.), *In the Mirror: Literature and Politics in Siam in the American Era* (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1985), pp. 9–87. Long before the US Peace Corps involvement in sports and village life, King Vajiravudh (r. 1910–1925) had been central to the establishment of sports as a vehicle for national integration and new social alignments in Siam. See Walter F. Vella, *Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978).

34 This is at the 2001 exchange rate of Thai Baht 40 to the US Dollar, higher than during the 1997 financial crisis but significantly lower than during the early 1990s.

35 Sujibatr, *Sujibatr kan khengkhan kila iu mien samphan khrang thi 13* (Program for the 13th Iu Mien Games) 24–27 March. Jao Mae Luang Village, Village No. 6, Mae Ngon subdistrict, Fang District, Chiang-mai Province, 2001 (2544 Buddhist Era) (mimeographed).

36 J. Clifford, *Routes* (1997), p. 218.

37 Jean Jackson, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious: The Politics of Indianness in the Vaupes, Colombia," *American Ethnologist* 22:1 (1995), p. 17.

38 Craig J. Reynolds, "Globalization and Cultural Nationalism in Modern Thailand," in Joel S. Kahn (ed.), *Southeast Asian Identities* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 134–8.

39 Yoko Hayami, "Internal and External Discourse of Communality, Tradition, and Environment: Minority Claims on Forest in the Northern Hills of Thailand," *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu* (Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto) 35 (3) (1997), pp. 558–79; James Ockey, "Weapons of the Urban Weak: Democracy and Resistance to Eviction in Bangkok Slum Communities," *Sojourn* 12 (1) (1997), pp. 1–25.

40 Acciaioli, G., "Culture as Art: From Practice to Spectacle in Indonesia," Canberra Anthropology, 8 (1&2) (1985), pp. 148–72; John Pemberton, *On the Subject of "Java"* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

41 Confer S. Harrell, "Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them: Introduction," in S. Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp. 3–36.

42 Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Bowie, *Rituals of National Loyalty* (1997).

43 Outsiders' location of timeless tradition among Mien and other Yao peoples is increasingly through collections of material culture and ritual texts, and occurs both nationally and internationally. See Jonsson, "Yao Minority Identity and the Location of Difference in the South China Borderlands," *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology* 65 (1) (2000), pp. 56–82; "Yao Collectibles" (review article), *Journal of the Siam Society* 88 (1&2) (2000), pp. 222–31; and "Encyclopedic Yao in Thailand" (review article), *Asian Ethnicity* 4 (2) (2003), pp. 295–301.

44 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

45 Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

46 Marshall Sahlins, "Cosmologies of Capitalism: The Trans-Pacific Sector of 'The World System'," in Sahlins, *Culture in Practice* (New York: Zone Books, 2000), pp. 415–69; and "The Sadness of Sweetness, or, The Native Anthropology of Western Cosmology," in Sahlins, *Culture in Practice*, pp. 527–83.

47 Pemberton, *On the Subject of "Java"* (1994).

48 Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870–1914," in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), pp. 263–307.

49 Pemberton, *On the Subject of "Java"* (1994).

50 O. W. Wolters, *Culture, History, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, revised ed., 1999).

51 For issues and rhetoric relevant to the notion of indigenous peoples, see R. H. Barnes, Andrew Gray and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *Indigenous Peoples of Asia* (Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, 1995); and Kay Warren and Jean Jackson (eds.), *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation and the State in Latin America* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002).

52 Hayami describes a novel ceremony-protest, where ethnic minority Karen claimed local forest (that was otherwise to be logged out) on the grounds that they were Buddhist and cared for the environment, which again assumes that non-Buddhist hill tribes are destructive of the environment. Rather than trying to counter or undermine this stereotype, Karen peoples, who do not have the power to influence the shape of public opinion to any extent, chose to position themselves as the opposite of what Thai consider hill tribes to be. See Yoko Hayami "Internal and External Discourse of Communality, Tradition, and Environment," *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu* 35 (3) (1997), pp. 558–79.

53 For reasons of space, many dimensions of this fair are left out of the present account. For further aspects of the case and its context, see Jonsson, "Mien Through Sports and Culture".

54 Dilip Parameswar Gaonkar (ed.), *Alternative Modernities* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

55 Anna L. Tsing, *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, *Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2nd ed., 2002).

Part III
Prospects